Harim Peiris

A small problem with Gota

By Harim Peiris

The joint opposition after its May day rally seems to running out of steam. It is always difficult to have a sustained opposition campaign with no election or democratic opportunity of government change in the offing and the leading lights of the joint opposition (JO), basically the small party allies with the UPFA and a little over a third of the SLFP has been trying to oppose the Sirisena / Wickramasinghe national government almost before the ink was dry on the results sheets of their twin electoral defeats in 2015.

The latest setback for the JO was the comprehensive defeat of their no confidence motion against Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake. Not only was the motion defeated but it almost touched the two thirds mark with one hundred and forty-five (145) votes against, with one hundred and fifty (150) being the magical two thirds. The JO could only muster fifty-one (51) votes and that with the JVP voting for the motion. The main opposition TNA abstained. What the voting in Parliament demonstrated is actually the parliamentary strength which the National Government commands, when it uses a three-line whip and has essential business to accomplish. Even its much amended budget was finally passed with more than a two thirds majority and of course the motion to create a new constitution, which had all the potential to be controversial was adopted unanimously. This is in no small measure due to the consensus creating ability of President Sirisena, who by nature is a consensus builder. This process takes time, which is often criticised as being a slow process, but it is sure, in that it has sufficient support to be durable.

The latest initiative of the defeated Rajapaksa camp to raise its head has been the not entirely new suggestion that the former Defence Secretary and Rajapaksa sibling be installed as a senior SLFP leader. This on the basis that he should get considerable credit for the ending the war and would be presumably a future electoral asset to the SLFP.  This reasoning is somewhat flawed and entirely untimely.

Firstly, President Sirisena clearly has a public mandate received in January 2016, that was unequivocally a clear repudiation of Rajapaksa rule. Gotabaya Rajapaksa was not only intimately a part of the three brothers who ran the country, but towards the latter period, the clearly brother number two (pun unintended) and also the sharp end of the stick or the muscle of the Administration. Sri Lanka was notorious for white van abductions, human rights abuse and threats to the media. The Defence Secretary by virtue of his office and rather than even the allegations of complicity were responsible for the situation. Mahinda Rajapaksa and his Administration has the unique distinction of being the only incumbent presidency to be voted out of by the Sri Lankan electorate and that from an entrenched and all-encompassing control of the Sri Lankan state. Accordingly, for all the talk of popularity, his credibility as an alternative to the government or as a leader in waiting is rather low and the parliamentary strength of his Joint Opposition rather weak, in that enables the government to muster the all important two thirds majority when needed. To insist or suggest a senior role in a jointly ruling party would be an abrogation of the mandate of January 2015 and a travesty of the democratic process.

Now unlike many other SLFP leaders who switched their support to Maithripala Sirisena after the election victory of January 2015, Gota and indeed any of the Rajapaksa’s or their allies in the Joint Opposition have neither expressed support for President Sirisena or demonstrated that it accepts some of the key pillars of the Administration’s mandate to re-democratise Sri Lanka.

One argument used by the few politicians promoting a Gota entry, is the moral persuasion of his contribution to ending our long running civil war and that the SLFP almost owes it to him. The weakness in this argument of course, is that the loudest proponents of the former Defence Secretary are the most deafeningly silent on the role, rights, privileges and dues of the former Army Commander Field Marshall Sarath Fonseka. In fact, Sarath Fonseka, can escape political culpability as a professional solider, who later politically challenged the Rajapaksa’s while the Defence Secretary was a key leader in his brother’s administration.

However, the lesson of the January 2015 election and indeed of the 2010 election and the 2014 Uva Provincial Council election, is that “ending the war” as a standalone election winner was waning and insufficient. Even former President Rajapaksa realised this as early as 2009, which is why he brought forward the previous presidential election to 2010 and informed Parliament and the SLFP that in future, governments would not have a war to blame for economic woes and the electorate would judge governments on governance and economic performance. Regrettably for Sri Lanka the Rajapaksa Administration in its second term, was found wanting quite badly on both scores and the electorate delivered its verdict, not once but twice in 2015. The Joint Opposition’s impatience to overturn the verdict of the people, without waiting for the next end of the term in 2020, through various backroom deals and machinations, while understandable and perhaps even fair game, in the rough and tumble of politics, should be stoutly resisted by the 6.2 million Sri Lankan who voted for change in January 2015 and do not want a retreat to the past.